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Abstract
This paper explores the dynamics of wage growth in corporate
hierarchies. Using panel data techniques, we estimate the causal eﬀect
of current and past transitions in reporting level and past earnings
growth on components of current earnings and earnings growth using
a large panel of US executives. After conditioning on unobserved
heterogeneity, current compensation growth is positively correlated
with past promotion outcomes but negatively correlated with past
compensation growth. In a ﬂexible model of wage growth, there is
an important asymmetry between the eﬀect of a promotion and a
demotion. The eﬀect of promotion is smaller in magnitude than the
eﬀect of a demotion. The causal eﬀect of a promotion is positive on
∗We thank Bentley MacLeod, Thomas Dohmen, Peter Mueser, Zhong Zhao and seminar
participants at IZA and at the 2005 SOLE/EALE Meetings in San Francisco. The support
of a Marie Curie Fellowship for the Transfer of Knowledge is gratefully acknowledged by
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both growth in base pay and total cash compensation but is negative
on bonus growth. The eﬀect of a demotion is negative on growth in
all pay components.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C33, J41, M5, M51
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1 Introduction
The correlation between earnings growth and promotion is well accepted in
the personnel economics literature.1 The statistical analysis of this relation-
ship is typically conﬁned to descriptive statistics, correlations or standard
linear regression techniques that do not address selectivity and endogeneity
issues. For this reason, economists should be reluctant to give a causal inter-
pretation to the results that have emerged in the literature. As the evolving
personnel economics literature is clarifying and adding detail to aspects of
pay and promotion in internal labor markets largely through new case stud-
ies, a valuable contribution at this point would be to address the issues of
unobserved individual heterogeneity and the endogeneity of transition indica-
tors (promotion and demotion). This requires the use of static and dynamic
panel data techniques.
This paper studies the dynamics of wage growth in corporate hierarchies.
With a focus on internal labor markets, it may be viewed as contributing to
the research in personnel economics, as well being part of a larger literature
on wage growth. Part of the contribution to the wage growth literature is the
ability to examine the role played by intraﬁrm mobility in wage dynamics. In
regards to personnel economics, this paper addresses some of the fundamen-
tal questions that have been posed by theoreticians in the ﬁeld. In Lazear’s
Presidential Address to the Society of Labor Economists [1999], he suggests
new areas for research in personnel economics including the eﬀect of past
success on current wage growth (the halo eﬀect) and the eﬀect of the busi-
ness environment on current wage growth. We ﬁnd evidence of halo eﬀects
resulting from past promotion and ﬁnd that changes in ﬁrm proﬁtability have
an eﬀect on compensation growth through the bonus component.
In line with theoretical work in the literature, we pay particular atten-
tion to the role of past promotions and wage growth indicators in explaining
current wage growth. This has economic relevance because some models of
wage and promotion dynamics imply serially correlated wage changes and
promotions accompanied by large wage increases.2 Using panel data tech-
niques, this paper estimates the causal eﬀect of current and past transitions
in reporting level and past earnings growth on components (base pay and
annual bonus) of current earnings and earnings growth. We address the po-
1For instance, see Lazear [1992], Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom [1994] and Seltzer and
Merrett [2000].
2See Gibbons and Waldman [1999].
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tential sources of serial correlation in compensation growth, diﬀerentiating
between the eﬀect of past promotion and past compensation growth. After
conditioning on unobserved individual heterogeneity, which removes the per-
sistent individual speciﬁc component of compensation growth, we ﬁnd that
changes in compensation are caused by past promotion, not past compensa-
tion growth.
Aside from examining determinants of compensation growth, other spe-
ciﬁc questions are addressed.3 (1) Are nominal wage cuts rare? We ﬁnd
reductions in nominal base pay to be rare but not reductions in nominal
annual bonuses or total cash compensation. (2) Is the convexity of the hi-
erarchical pay structure robust to the allowance of individual unobserved
heterogeneity? Tournament theory suggests that convexity should persist af-
ter accounting for individual heterogeneity. We ﬁnd this is the case, although
accounting for individual heterogeneity reduces the extent of the convexity.
(3) Are changes in wages serially correlated? We can not reject the hypoth-
esis that changes in base pay have no correlation with the lagged changes in
base pay. Changes in bonus pay and total cash compensation have a negative
correlation with their lagged values. (4) Is distinguishing between the behav-
ior of base and bonus pay in response to promotion important? There has
been little theoretical investigation of the behavior of the components of cash
compensation in response to promotion because base pay and bonus pay have
not been distinguished from one another in models of promotion dynamics.
We ﬁnd that the eﬀects of promotion on base pay growth and bonus growth
are asymmetric. (5) Is distinguishing between the eﬀects of promotions and
demotions important? Demotion has a much stronger (and negative) eﬀect
on compensation growth than promotion and the eﬀects of demotion are not
diminished by accounting for unobserved individual heterogeneity.
2 The Data
This paper analyzes a proprietary panel data set containing approximately
25,000 executives per year working at over 600 large US ﬁrms from 1981 to
1988.4 As our focus is on wage growth, our sample includes only executives
appearing in at least two consecutive years. This sample contains up to eight
3Some of these questions are posed in Gibbons [1997].
4Bognanno [2001] and Belzil and Bognanno [2004] contain additional descriptions and
summary statistics of these data.
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observations per individual on 33,482 individuals employed at 385 ﬁrms. The
database contains characteristics of the individual, including base pay, annual
bonus, age, education, and tenure, the position, including job title, including
reporting level, and the ﬁrm, including proﬁts, sales, and employment. We
deﬁne promotions and demotions as changes in reporting level. Executives in
the data range from the CEO (level 1) to those eleven reporting levels beneath
the CEO (level 12). The data allows the movement of executives within their
ﬁrms to be observed along with the consequent changes in compensation and
job characteristics.
Summary statistics of these data are provided in the Appendix. Table
A1 presents the means of individual and ﬁrm characteristics based on the
ﬁrst observation of each individual or ﬁrm. Table A2 presents the percentage
of executives receiving increasing, constant or decreasing pay. Total pay
is broken down into annual bonus and base pay. The top panel reﬂects
changes in nominal pay, the bottom panel changes in real pay. Consistent
with other studies, reductions in nominal base pay are rare.5 Less than 1% of
executives suﬀer reductions in nominal base pay in an average year. Constant
nominal base pay is not uncommon. Almost 16% of executives receive no
increase in nominal base pay in a given year. One quarter of executives
suﬀer reductions in their nominal annual bonus. It should be noted that
executives not receiving a bonus at all are included as among those with
no change in their annual bonus. Reductions in total nominal pay are not
infrequent due to the ﬂuctuations in bonuses. About 13% of executives suﬀer
reductions in total nominal pay in a given year. Not surprisingly, with the
frequency of executives with constant nominal base pay and reductions in
annual bonuses, a signiﬁcant share of executives realizes reductions in real
total pay. Roughly one quarter of executives suﬀer a decline real total pay
in a given year.
Table A3 presents mean changes in ﬁrm characteristics and pay. This
table hints at a sensitivity between changes in ﬁrm characteristics and annual
bonuses. For example, in 1983 with a reduction in ﬁrm proﬁts, sales and size,
bonus payments declined on average in the sample and executives moved
slightly further from the CEO in reporting level. The empirical analysis to
follow explores these relationships in depth.
Table A4 illustrates the changes in reporting level that take place in the
5See Gibbs and Hendricks [2004] for a survey of the personnel economics literature on
the rarity of nominal wage cuts and other stylized facts.
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data and the mean change in real compensation. It is clear that changes
in base pay follow an orderly pattern in regards to changes in level relative
to the changes in the annual bonus. It appears as though ﬁrms reward
promoted executives with greater increases in base pay and smaller increases
in bonuses, causing total pay to increase less than would be the case without
the oﬀsetting eﬀect in bonuses. This pattern of compensating for the change
in base pay with the change in the bonus also appears to hold to some extent
for demotions when demotions of one, two or three levels are compared to
each other.
Table A4 also shows that remaining in the same reporting level is the
most likely outcome for an executive. Three quarters of executives remain in
the same level in the subsequent year. Promotions are slightly more frequent
than demotions. Promotions occur in 13% of subsequent years, demotions
in 12%. The vast majority of promotions and demotions are of one level,
though multi-level transitions do take place. The theoretical work on careers
in organizations has paid little attention to demotions and lateral movements
[McCue 1996]. This may be unwarranted because demotions have been doc-
umented in various ﬁrm case studies and strongly appear in our data.6 Our
rates of demotion appear large in comparison to other studies. Direct com-
parisons with other studies are made diﬃcult because of diﬀerences in the
way transitions are deﬁned and because the frequency of demotion appears
to vary with the time period studied.7
6Lazear [1992] found that the sum of demotions and lateral transfers exceeded promo-
tions in his 13 year panel of workers employed by a large manufacturing ﬁrm. Workers
were 1.875 times more likely to be demoted or transferred laterally than promoted. The
records of N.V. Fokker indicate an annual promotion rate of 5.6% and an annual rate of
demotion of 1.6% [Dohmen, Kriechel, and Pfann 2003]. In a study of workers entering
the Union Bank of Australia between 1887 and 1900, Seltzer and Merrett’s [2000] data
indicate promotion occurred 2.1 times more often than demotions. In a rare study focus-
ing on demotion, Goldner [1965] examined the management practices at a large industrial
ﬁrm. Management employees viewed demotion “as a normal part of their future.” Goldner
states, “Patterns of mobility within an organization, including demotion, are a crucial part
of its structure.”
7While the number of ﬁrm case studies is not large, evidence appears to suggest that
demotions are sensitive to the conditions at the ﬁrm during the time period studied.With
ﬁrm management growing at an annual rate of 8%, Gibbs [1992] found demotions to be less
than 1% of transitions. In their analysis of Canadian Paciﬁc Railway data, Hamilton and
MacKinnon [2001] ﬁnd that demotions were more frequent during the depression years,
though the use of demotions was common even during periods of growth. Similarly, the
personnel records of Dutch national aircraft builder N.V. Fokker indicate that demotion
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A central reason for the higher rate of demotions (and transitions in
general) in our study is because hierarchical movement is deﬁned as a change
in reporting level, not as a change in job title.8 Reporting level changes are
more frequent that job title changes. Pooling data across individuals and
years, 89% of executives remain in the same job title where as 75% remain
in the same reporting level. If we ignore reporting level changes that are
not also accompanied by job title changes, our rates of demotion relative to
promotion are closer to those of other studies. Promotions by this criterion
are 1.6 times more likely than demotions. If we now consider changes in job
title with no change in level to also be promotions, the rate of promotion
would be 9.1% against a rate of demotion of 1.8%. This is what we might
have come up with in regards to the frequency of promotions and demotions
if reporting level information was not available in the data. Though both
job title changes and level changes are important to pay and other measures
of position importance, changes in reporting level represent a common and
unambiguous metric of promotion across ﬁrms.
Table A5 presents correlations between the changes in base pay, annual
bonus and total cash compensation and their lagged values. At this simple
level, changes in base pay are essentially uncorrelated with their lagged val-
ues. Bonus and total compensation have a weak negative correlation with
their past changes. These relationships are explored much more thoroughly
in sections that follow.
rates rose as the ﬁrm neared insolvency [Dohmen, Kriechel, and Pfann 2003].
8If we used job title changes to deﬁne promotion, we would then have to order job titles
on the basis of pay, responsibility or reporting level to determine whether the movement
between jobs constituted a promotion, demotion or lateral transfer. This is not as clean
as directly using the reporting level provided in the data and changes of more than one
level would be diﬃcult to identify. Additionally, if pay measures were used to deﬁne
job titles changes as promotions, the positive eﬀect of promotion on compensation would
exist by construction. We experimented with deﬁning promotions (demotions) as job title
changes accompanied by more (fewer) number of employees beneath the incumbent but
found that demotions and staying in the same jobcode had nearly the same eﬀect on total
compensation but that the incumbent’s salary grade midpoint increased more in the case
of demotion. This seemed odd. The number of employees beneath an incumbent also
changes for ﬁrm related reasons, not just due to the movement of the incumbent. Using
job title changes to deﬁne promotion also presumes that the status of a job is ﬁxed. We
ﬁnd reporting level changes to occur for executives remaining in the same job title. We
believe that in these data reporting level changes are the best way to deﬁne promotion.
7
3 The Convexity of the Compensation Struc-
ture
The ﬁrst model speciﬁcation investigated is a static regression model where
compensation is tied to level, and is aﬀected by ﬁrm speciﬁc variables as well
as unobserved heterogeneity. We estimate this model to determine if the
convexity of the corporate compensation structure is robust to allowing for
unobserved individual heterogeneity. The model is speciﬁed as follows:
lnCijt = Ziγ +Xijtβ + Lrijt · δr + αi + εijt (1)
where
 lnCijt is the logarithm of compensation of individual i at ﬁrm j at time
t. Compensation is measured in real terms (in thousands of 1980 U.S.
dollars).
 Zi is a vector of individual speciﬁc time invariant attributes measured
at the start of the panel (education, age and tenure)
 Xijt is a vector of time varying individual/ﬁrm speciﬁc variables (ﬁrm
proﬁts, ﬁrm sales and ﬁrm size as measured by the number of em-
ployees). Proﬁts are measured in billions of 1980 US dollars. Firm
size is measured in thousands of employees. Employment changes are
calculated as the percentage over the previous year.
 Lrijt is rank speciﬁc binary indicator (r=1,2...12). It is computed as
Lrijt = 1 if Lijt = r and 0 if not, where Lijt refers to the rank of
individual i in ﬁrm j at date t.
 αi is an individual/ﬁrm speciﬁc unobserved factor, potentially corre-
lated with Xijt, Lrijt(or Lijt) and Zi.The distinction between individual
and ﬁrm speciﬁc attributes is problematic, given the structure of the
sample data. While it is possible to observe a few ﬁrm speciﬁc variables
(to be discussed below), the movement of executives between ﬁrms can-
not be observed in the data set that we use. Therefore, the data do
not allow us to identify the ﬁrm speciﬁc unobserved term from the in-
dividual speciﬁc term. Without loss of generality, we therefore refer to
the unobserved factors as individual speciﬁc.
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 εijt is a random shock (iid) with a mean of zero.
 β, δr and γ (only when the model is estimated by OLS) are parameters
to be estimated. Note that δr represent the eﬀect of changing level,
and as such, does not distinguish between a promotion and a demotion.
Potential asymmetries will be discussed later.
In this section, we assume that both Xijt and Lrijt are strongly exogenous.
That is, after conditioning on αi,
E(Xijtεijs) = E(Lrijtεijs) = 0 ∇t, s (2)
and we therefore focus solely on the eﬀect of neglected unobserved factors.
Models addressing contemporaneous endogeneity between level changes and
compensation are presented in the sections to follow.
With the speciﬁcation above, it is possible to uncover the true eﬀect
of moving across levels on contemporaneous compensation after removing
unobserved individual heterogeneity. We illustrate the eﬀects of unobserved
heterogeneity by reporting OLS estimates as well as ﬁxed eﬀects estimates.
These estimates are found in table 1. The level speciﬁc parameter estimates
have been transformed into marginal eﬀects of transiting from one grade level
to the next in table 2. There are two striking results. First, the pay structure
appears convex. The estimates of table 2 implies that movement from level
8 to level 7 results in a 14% increase in total pay, while movement from
level 2 to level 1 increases total pay by 84%. This illustrates the accepted
notion that corporate pay structures are highly convex.9 In a model where
wages are attached to individual speciﬁc intercept terms, as well as reporting
level, the OLS estimates are only unbiased if this individual speciﬁc term is
orthogonal to the level. This is unlikely because high ability individuals are
presumably more likely to be found at higher levels in the ﬁrm. The gains to
promotions represented in the OLS estimates would then be an overestimate
of the rewards that occur in the year of promotion because they measure the
mean diﬀerence in pay between levels, ignoring the unobserved diﬀerences
between individuals. Looking at the ﬁxed eﬀect results provides support for
9Empirical evidence of wage convexity in US corporate hierarchies is found by Leonard
[1990], Bognanno [2001] and in the United Kingdom by Conyon, Peck and Sadler [2001].
Convexity also results in various theoretical models [Calvo and Wellisz, 1979, Rosen, 1982,
Rosen, 1986].
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this notion. The convexity of the compensation structure is reduced after
accounting for unobserved individual heterogeneity.
The second striking result is the diﬀerentiated eﬀect of level on base
pay versus bonus. As we have measures of two of the components of total
compensation, base pay and annual bonus, we can compute a level speciﬁc
value for each pay component. The estimates of table 2 also reveal that the
cause of the convexity in the pay structure is due entirely to base pay. While
it is clear from table 1 that bonuses increase with level, table 2 shows that
the marginal eﬀect of a change in level on the bonus is erratic.
In as much as ﬁxed eﬀect estimates enable us to net out the eﬀect of
unobserved individual heterogeneity, they may still provide an incomplete
picture of the true wage dynamics caused by promotion. First, in a model
with individual speciﬁc eﬀects in the intercept term, we do not allow for
individual speciﬁc pay growth other than pay growth caused by movement
between levels. For instance, diﬀerences in the returns to tenure are not
allowed. Second, modeling pay as a function of level imposes symmetry in
the eﬀects of promotions and demotions that might not be warranted. For
these two reasons, we model pay growth in the next section.
4 The Eﬀect of Promotions and Demotions
on Compensation Growth
Appendix table A4 documented the likelihood of promotions and demotions
in a given year. It is evident from this table that, contrary to conventional
wisdom, demotions are frequent enough to merit attention. Additionally,
though rare, promotions and demotions of two or more levels occur. We
model both demotion and promotion in this section, accounting for changes
of more than one level. In what follows, we present OLS and ﬁxed eﬀect
estimates of a model of compensation growth. The model is speciﬁed as
follows:
∆Cit = ∆Xijtβ + promit(1) · δp1 + ...+ promit(3−more) · δp3+ (3)
demit(1) · δp1 + ...+ demit(3−more) · δp3 + αi + εijt
where
 ∆Cijt = Cijt+1 − Cijt and denotes compensation growth.
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The prom and dem variables are indicators for the number of levels as-
sociated to a particular promotion or demotion. That is
 promijt(r) = 1 if ∆Lijt = −r and 0 if not (for r ≥ 1)
 demijt(r) = 1 if ∆Lijt = r and 0 if not (for r ≥ 1)
 ∆Lijt = Lijt+1 − Lijt
As the dependent variable is the diﬀerence in compensation, αi represents
individual heterogeneity in compensation growth. As argued in the previous
section, the individual speciﬁc term is likely to be correlated with promotion
outcomes. This speciﬁcation will allow us to remove the individual speciﬁc
component of wage growth.
We assume that, after conditioning on αi,
E(promijt · εijs) = E(demijt · εijs) = 0 ∇t, s (4)
The estimates are found in table 3. First, there is a striking discrep-
ancy between the eﬀect of a promotion and a demotion on wage growth.
For instance, OLS estimates imply that a one level promotion increases total
compensation growth by 958 dollars while a one level demotion is associated
with a 5,620 dollars decrease in compensation growth (column 3). As ex-
pected, ﬁxed eﬀects estimates imply a much more modest eﬀect for a one
level promotion around 129 dollars (column 6). As these estimates point out
to the smaller eﬀect of a promotion once the individual factor is removed,
they also imply that individual speciﬁc wage growth is positively correlated
with promotion outcomes. Interestingly, the eﬀect of demotion is not aﬀected
much by the ﬁxed eﬀect transformation. This suggests that demotions, as op-
posed to promotions are orthogonal with respect to individual speciﬁc wage
growth. This pattern is also veriﬁed upon investigation of the eﬀects of a
two level promotion and a two level demotion.
A second noticeable result pertains to the diﬀerent eﬀects of promotions
on base pay as opposed to bonus. Promotions of one level (∆L(−1)) are
recognized through large increases in base pay growth (1,590 dollars accord-
ing to OLS and 1,350 according to ﬁxed eﬀects estimates) and a reduction
in bonus growth (649 according to OLS and 1,200 according to ﬁxed eﬀects),
with a net positive eﬀect on the growth in total cash compensation (as men-
tioned above).10 Firms appear to compensate for higher base pay growth
10Gibbs [1995] ﬁnds that bonuses tend to fall upon a one level promotion.
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with lesser bonus growth in the year of promotion. We oﬀer some potential
explanations to conclude the section.
The estimates obtained for promotions of two levels (∆L(−2)) or three
levels or more (∆L(−3)) show that growth in total compensation is much
larger in the case of multi-level promotions. Demotions reduce growth in all
compensation measures, have eﬀects that grow signiﬁcantly with the extent
of the demotion and have much larger eﬀects on compensation growth than
promotions. Finally, it is also interesting to note that bonuses, unlike base
pay, are particularly sensitive to ﬂuctuations in proﬁt. A increase in proﬁts
will typically increase bonus growth by a signiﬁcant amount (a 19,000 dollar
increase in bonus growth in the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation) but will have a
negligible eﬀect on base pay (around 1,000 dollars).
We know of no theoretical work that diﬀerentiates between the change in
base pay and bonus pay in regards to promotion. At this point, we can only
oﬀer a few potential explanations for the smaller bonus growth for those
promoted one level. Prendergast [1998] states that ﬁrms set pay in strict
adherence to the salary range assigned to the individual’s job classiﬁcation.
Evidence of rigid salary ranges is found in Gibbs and Hendricks [2004] and
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom [1994]. Rigidities caused by adherence to a
salary grade structure might constrain the increase in base pay available for
good workers without current promotion opportunities and a larger bonus
payment may be paid in substitution. Alternatively, Fairburn and Malcom-
son [2001] present a model in which the interests of managers diﬀer from
those of the ﬁrm. Managers are subject to inﬂuence activities in the award-
ing of bonuses but have ﬁnancial incentives to award promotions to the most
deserving candidates. If an agency problem exists with regard to managers,
perhaps it manifests itself in managers using the bonus to smooth compen-
sation changes across workers to maintain morale. Last, using the bonus to
counteract the change in the base pay, at least in regards to being promoted
one level or remaining at the same level, might be done to smooth the changes
in compensation over time for a given worker. The desire to smooth changes
in compensation over time for a worker is noted by Prendergast [1998] to be
a feature of risk sharing contracts.
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5 Compensation Growth Dynamics: What
have you done for me lately?
The dynamics of promotion and wage growth has been recognized as an im-
portant issue. Knowing the causal eﬀect of past promotion outcomes or past
compensation growth on future compensation growth may help understand
the strategic dimensions of ﬁrm wage policies.11 Using personnel data from
a single ﬁrm, Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom [1994 b] ﬁnd serial correlation
in wage changes and residuals. Prendergast’s [1998] survey of the literature
on compensation policies notes that studies using personnel data have found
serial correlation in individual rewards, largely through providing evidence
of promotion fast tracks, but that the evidence of serial correlation in wage
changes is mixed in studies employing larger data sets.
The literature refers to "halo eﬀects" as the eﬀect of past performance on
future compensation. We examine the role of past performance on compen-
sation changes through the use of lagged values of compensation changes and
lagged values of level changes. Although promotions are sometimes deﬁned
in the literature through compensation changes, we note that it is not obvi-
ous that lagged promotion outcomes and lagged compensation growth must
aﬀect current compensation growth in the same way. If promotion is a better
performance indicator than compensation growth, we may expect a stronger
positive correlation between compensation growth and past promotions than
between compensation growth and past compensation growth. This may be
in the case in internal labor markets if administrative pay policies (such as
pay grades) and practices (uniform performance evaluations) are restrictive
in recognizing performance diﬀerences relative to policies governing promo-
tions.
In the context of a model of endogenous compensation growth, these
issues may investigated by allowing the individual speciﬁc compensation
growth to depend on past and current promotion outcomes and on past
compensation growth. To assess the impact of past compensation growth,
we re-formulate our compensation growth model as the following dynamic
panel data model,
11Belzil and Bognanno [2004] investigate the notion of fast tracks in promotion outcomes.
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∆Cit =
PX
p=0
λp ·∆Lit−p +
QX
q=1
αq ·∆Cit−q +∆Xijtβ + αi + εijt (5)
where
 ∆Cit−q = Cit+1−q − Cit−q
 ∆Lit−p = Lit+1−p − Lit−p
Unlike what was done in the previous section, we do not diﬀerentiate
between past promotion and demotion indicators. We do this in order to
restrict the number of parameters.12 Estimation of the causal eﬀects of
past compensation growth may be achieved using standard GMM estima-
tion methods [Arellano and Bond, 1991]. The estimation method requires
the use of lagged values of the endogenous variables, as well as exogenous
variables (in the weak sense or in the strong sense) as instruments, in order
to build a set of conditional moment restrictions. At this stage, we also relax
the assumption that current promotion (Lit+1−Lit) is exogenous, and allow
for endogeneity (contemporaneous). That is, after conditioning on αi,
E((Lit+1 − Lit) · εijs) 6= 0 for s ≤ t and Lit+1 − Lit) · εijs) = 0 for s)t (6)
In the analysis presented below, we focus on lagged values of promotions
and compensation growth of order three and four.13
5.1 The eﬀect of past compensation growth
First, we estimate a model of compensation dynamics with three and four
lags without current and past promotions (αp = 0). The estimates are found
in table 4. In speciﬁcations of either three or four lags, for both base pay
and bonuses, past pay increases do not cause future positive increases after
accounting for unobserved persistent individual heterogeneity (this removes
12If we did, it would require eight lagged binary variables.
13This is driven by the fact that we have access to only eight years of data and seven
observations on compensation growth.
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the individual speciﬁc component of wage growth). In the speciﬁcation with
three lags, the causal eﬀect of past pay increases, when statistically signif-
icant, is found to be negative at all lags. This is true regardless of the
nature of compensation (base versus bonus). However, the negative correla-
tion between current bonus change and past bonus changes is much stronger.
When the lag structure is extended to four periods, similar results are found.
Again, the negative persistence in earnings growth is explained mostly by
the negative correlation in bonus growth.
In all of the dynamic speciﬁcations we tested for second order serial cor-
relation using the test developed by Arellano and Bond [1991]. The data
systematically fails to reject the null hypothesis (that there is no serial cor-
relation). This is important because the consistency of the Arellano Bond
estimator requires random shocks to be serially uncorrelated.
5.2 Halo eﬀects: The result of past compensation growth
or past promotion?
In the unrestricted model, past compensation growth (αq), current promotion
(λ0) and past promotions (λ1,..λQ) aﬀect current compensation growth. This
model is able to assess the source of potential halo eﬀects. These estimates are
found in table 5. In regards to the change in level variables (∆L), promotions
reﬂect negative changes in level and demotions reﬂect positive changes in
level (the top position is level 1). When the coeﬃcients on level changes
are negative, it indicates promotions (demotions) have a positive (negative)
eﬀect on the change in compensation.
There is very strong evidence in favor of persistent halo eﬀects from past
promotion on current base pay growth (column 1 and column 4). The nega-
tive eﬀects of level change observed in column 1 (-1.43 for current promotion
down to -0.32 for the promotion outcome at lag three) indicate that past pro-
motion increases base pay growth and that the eﬀect of past promotion decays
steadily. When the lag structure is extended to four periods, we observed
similar results. The estimates range from -1.77 for the current promotion to
-0.14 at lag four.
At the same time, and as observed in table 4, there is no evidence of pos-
itive halo eﬀects from past compensation growth. Past base pay growth has
virtually no eﬀect beyond one lag. These numbers imply that sustained com-
pensation growth is mostly explained by promotion (changes in level), rather
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than by past compensation growth. Interestingly, the dynamics of bonus
growth are much more diﬃcult to establish. Virtually all of the coeﬃcients
pertaining to past promotions (even current promotion) are insigniﬁcant.
The imprecision is particularly noticeable with a lag structure of four peri-
ods. As base pay represents 85% of total compensation, we may assert that
the positive correlation between total compensation and past promotions
(columns 3 and 6) is mainly explained by base pay.
Why would one period lags have a negative eﬀect on the change in the
given compensation measure for all three measures of compensation and for
lagged values in bonus and total compensation going back even further?
At least in regards to base pay, the work of Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom
[1994] may provide some guidance. They document what they refer to as a
"green card" eﬀect. Supervisors were provided cards (sometimes green) with
a matrix of salary raises that were dependent on the executive’s performance
rating and position in the salary grade. Ceteris paribus, executives paid
towards the top of their grade received smaller salary increases. In our data,
larger increases in base pay in the previous period push an executive higher
in the salary range and this may necessitate a smaller subsequent raise if
salaries are constrained by green card eﬀects. By a similar logic, bonus pools
are limited, it may not be feasible to follow an increase in the bonus with a
subsequently larger increase. It may be that a type of green card eﬀect also
operate with bonuses. Clearly though the process must be diﬀerent because
the lagged changes in the bonuses have a signiﬁcant eﬀect even three years
prior in the model with four lags whereas only the ﬁrst lag is signiﬁcant for
base pay changes.
5.3 Is Current Promotion Status Endogenous?
As a ﬁnal exercise, we investigate the diﬀerences in the eﬀect of a current
promotion on earnings growth between the case where current promotion is
allowed to be endogenous (table 5) and the case where current promotion is
assumed exogenous (table 6). As argued before, a correlation between cur-
rent promotion and the random shock aﬀecting earnings growth may persist
even after removing individual unobserved factors which presumable are non-
orthogonal to promotion status. In particular, it is interesting to evaluate
which determinant of total compensation (base pay or bonus) is aﬀected the
most by contemporaneous endogeneity.
A review of table 6 indicates that the eﬀect of a promotion on base pay
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is relatively robust to the allowance for contemporaneous exogeneity. With
three lags in both past compensation and past promotions, current promotion
raises base pay by 1.43 thousand dollars when it assumed to be endogenous
contemporaneously. When exogeneity is assumed, the corresponding esti-
mate is 1.18 thousand. In the model with four lags, the estimates are 1.77
thousand with endogeneity and 1.52 with contemporaneous exogeneity.
Unlike for base pay, the sensitivity of the eﬀect of promotion on bonus
growth to the exogeneity assumption is diﬃcult to evaluate, given the im-
precision of the estimates. With a three lag structure, and when assumed
endogenous, promotion raises bonus growth by 0.95 thousand dollars. When
assumed exogenous, the eﬀect is 0.40. With a lag stricture of four, the range
is even larger (an increase of ﬁve thousand when endogenous and a decrease
of 1.32 thousand when exogenous) but, again the low level of signiﬁcance
prevents any conclusions from being drawn.
To summarize, our panel data estimates of the eﬀects of a current pro-
motion indicate that, in terms of base pay, the most important statistical
issue to tackle is the non-orthogonality of individual unobserved factors with
individual promotion histories. Contemporaneous endogeneity appears to be
only a minor issue.
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6 Conclusion
This paper explored the dynamics of wage growth in corporate hierarchies.
While the principle ﬁndings of this paper relate to the convexity of the pay
structure and the eﬀect on current compensation growth of past changes in
reporting level and compensation, a few ﬁndings from the simple examination
of these data are worthy of note. First, reductions in nominal base pay are
rare. However, because nominal reductions in bonuses happen to about one
fourth of executives, nominal reductions in total cash compensation are not
at all uncommon. Second, changes in level overwhelmingly occur one level
at a time. When a level change is more than one level, the increase in
base pay is relatively orderly. The increase in the bonus with level change
is erratic with stationary executives receiving larger bonus increases than
promoted executives. Demotions of more than one level also brought large
bonus increases along with the smallest increases in base pay. The diﬀerence
in the behavior of base pay and bonus pay makes it insightful to consider the
diﬀerent components of pay individually.
The convexity of hierarchical pay structures appears robust to the al-
lowance for unobserved individual heterogeneity, though individual ﬁxed ef-
fects reduce the degree of convexity. Convexity in the pay structure is due
to the increasing growth in base pay with level.
In considering the eﬀects of multiple level promotions and demotions in
OLS and individual ﬁxed eﬀect models, we ﬁnd that the change in base pay
and total cash compensation varies as would be expected with the change in
level. However, as seen in the simple examination of the data, the immediate
beneﬁts of a one level promotion are somewhat masked because the higher
growth in base pay is partially oﬀset by this reduced growth in bonus pay.
We speculated that the lesser bonus growth accompanying a one level
promotion could result for a few diﬀerent reasons. First, the bonus change
may be used to circumvent rigidities imposed by the salary grade structure.
Second, if an agency problem exists with regard to managers, they use the
bonus to smooth compensation changes across workers to maintain pay equity
and morale, perhaps at the cost of weaker promotion incentives. Last, the
lesser bonus granted upon a one level promotion result from a risk sharing
contract that smooths the changes in compensation over time for a given
worker. Among the two components of total cash compensation, the annual
bonus is much more sensitive to ﬁrm time varying variables, especially proﬁts.
We ﬁnd that considering both promotion and demotion in hierarchies is
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important. Demotions, when indicated by a change in reporting level, occur
with only slightly less frequency than promotions and the eﬀect of demotion
on compensation growth is much greater in absolute value than the eﬀect
of promotion. While including ﬁxed eﬀects reduces the promotion driven
increase in compensation, it does not dampen the penalties associated with
demotion. The eﬀect of a demotion is negative on the growth of all pay
components.
In models of compensation dynamics in which the lagged changes in the
given compensation measure are treated endogenously and after conditioning
on unobserved heterogeneity, we do not ﬁnd these lagged values cause subse-
quent compensation increases. In fact, the one period lag values always have
a negative eﬀect on the change in the given compensation measure. This
may be a display of the "green card" eﬀect at least in regards to base pay.
Large increases in base pay in the past push an executive higher in the salary
range and this may necessitate smaller subsequent raises. The causal eﬀect
of promotion and its lags are positive on both the growth in base pay and to-
tal cash compensation but have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on bonus growth. Halo
eﬀects are found and result from past promotions, not past compensation
growth.
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Table 1 - Parameter Estimates
Type: OLS OLS OLS F.E. F.E. F.E
Dependent: Base Bonus Total Base Bonus Total
1 2 3 4 5 6
Level 1 2.3705 11.2779 2.7282 0.5963 3.7377 0.7156
(12.15) (3.32) (11.67) (8.00) (1.28) (6.66)
Level 2 1.5287 10.8402 1.7903 0.2368 3.8967 0.3430
(7.84) (3.19) (7.67) (3.20) (1.34) (3.21)
Level 3 1.0965 9.8879 1.2901 0.1376 3.8672 0.2367
(5.62) (2.91) (5.53) (1.86) (1.34) (2.22)
Level 4 0.8835 9.1186 1.0441 0.0893 3.7905 0.1824
(4.53) (2.69) (4.47) (1.21) (1.31) (1.71)
Level 5 0.7501 8.3960 0.8891 0.0655 3.4704 0.1508
(3.85) (2.47) (3.81) (0.89) (1.20) (1.41)
Level 6 0.6274 7.2660 0.7401 0.0485 3.2202 0.1273
(3.22) (2.14) (3.17) (0.66) (1.11) (1.19)
Level 7 0.5198 6.0870 0.6092 0.0470 3.0144 0.1257
(2.67) (1.79) (2.61) (0.64) (1.04) (1.18)
Level 8 0.4022 4.0539 0.4719 0.0523 2.1149 0.1237
(2.06) (1.19) (2.02) (0.71) (0.73) (1.16)
Level 9 0.2660 2.4705 0.3222 0.0456 2.2633 0.1188
(1.36) (0.73) (1.38) (0.62) (0.78) (1.11)
Proﬁts 0.1572 4.4411 0.2853 -0.0076 3.0047 0.1044
(24.87) (40.38) (37.70) (2.71) (27.58) (26.02)
Sales 0.0084 -0.1607 0.0025 0.0041 0.1447 0.0083
(21.10) (23.17) (5.29) (8.79) (7.83) (12.23)
Size 0.0025 0.0254 0.0030 0.0003 -0.0024 0.0004
(73.45) (47.19) (81.71) (7.79) (1.49) (7.07)
Education 0.0494 0.3526 0.0559
(89.03) (36.51) (84.12)
Tenure 0.0028 0.0242 0.0044
(22.58) (11.17) (29.22)
Age 0.0127 0.0505 0.0858
(88.10) (20.04) (62.94)
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Table 2 - Implied Eﬀects of Promotions
Type: OLS OLS OLS F.E. F.E. F.E
Dependent: Base Bonus Total Base Bonus Total
1 2 3 4 5 6
L2→L1 0.8418 0.4277 0.9379 0.3595 -0.1590 0.3726
L3→L2 0.4322 1.0523 0.5002 0.0992 0.0295 0.1063
L4→L3 0.2130 0.7693 0.2460 0.0483 0.0767 0.0443
L5→L4 0.1334 0.7226 0.1550 0.0238 0.3201 0.0316
L6→L5 0.1227 1.1300 0.1490 0.0170 0.2502 0.0235
L7→L6 0.1076 1.1790 0.1309 0.0015 0.2058 0.0016
L8→L7 0.1176 2.0331 0.1373 -0.0053 0.8995 0.0020
L9→L8 0.1362 1.5834 0.1497 0.0067 -0.1484 0.0049
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Table 3 - The Eﬀects of Promotions and Demotions on Earnings
Growth
Type: OLS OLS OLS F.E. F.E. F.E
Dependent: ∆Base ∆Bonus ∆Total ∆Base ∆Bonus ∆Total
1 2 3 4 5 6
∆L(−3) 13.2820 0.7208 14.0332 11.6006 -3.8183 7.8041
(11.18) (0.32) (4.99) (7.39) (1.30) (2.12)
∆L(−2) 2.2195 0.4205 2.6584 1.4436 -0.4833 0.9648
(6.77) (0.69) (3.42) (3.23) (0.58) (0.92)
∆L(−1) 1.5982 -0.6488 0.9577 1.3523 -1.2243 0.1292
(13.04) (2.81) (3.30) (8.43) (4.08) (0.34)
∆L(0) - - - - - -
∆L(+1) -2.6926 -2.9377 -5.6251 -2.4211 -2.8317 -5.2513
(20.75) (12.02) (18.31) (13.99) (8.74) (12.94)
∆L(+2) -15.5675 -10.5031 -26.0751 -18.6401 -11.8464 -30.4991
(44.08) (15.80) (31.19) (39.64) (13.46) (27.67)
∆L(+3) -47.5319 -30.6691 -78.1976 -62.4007 -42.5131 -104.9149
(56.42) (19.33) (39.21) (53.18) (19.36) (38.15)
∆Proﬁts 0.5020 16.1152 16.6030 1.1193 18.7063 19.7928
(1.79) (30.52) (25.01) (3.21) (28.64) (24.20)
∆Sales 0.5359 1.2050 1.7159 0.5477 1.3642 1.8746
(9.34) (11.15) (12.63) (7.14) (9.51) (10.43)
∆Size -0.0049 -0.0205 -0.0191 -0.0092 -0.0285 -0.0301
(1.00) (2.23) (1.65) (1.45) (2.40) (2.02)
Note: ∆L(−s) denotes a promotion of s levels. ∆L(+s) denotes a demo-
tion of s levels.
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Table 4 - Eﬀect of Past Earnings on Earnings Dynamics
Type: GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Dependent: ∆Base ∆Bonus ∆Total ∆Base ∆Bonus ∆Total
1 2 3 4 5 6
∆Baset−1 -0.1385 -0.1462
(6.16) (3.45)
∆Baset−2 0.0153 0.0831
(0.90) (2.27)
∆Baset−3 0.0018 0.0262
(0.51) (1.20)
∆Baset−4 0.0046
(1.11)
∆Bonust−1 -0.6774 -0.9281
(51.81) (43.85)
∆Bonust−2 -0.4263 -0.5997
(29.00) (21.03)
∆Bonust−3 -0.0570 -0.3515
(5.19) (12.41)
∆Bonust−4 -0.0307
(2.28)
∆Totalt−1 -0.6826 -1.0424
(51.93) (38.77)
∆Totalt−2 -0.3898 -0.6975
(28.98) (21.76)
∆Totalt−3 -0.0148 -0.3955
(2.33) (13.89)
∆Totalt−4 0.0053
(0.74)
∆Proﬁts 1.0522 14.5812 15.3164 0.7311 9.1779 12.7666
(2.30) (10.50) (10.60) (1.21) (5.03) (6.81)
∆Sales 0.1097 0.7163 1.0115 0.1076 0.5900 1.5326
(8.90) (1.88) (2.56) (0.65) (1.12) (3.04)
∆Size -0.0115 -0.0136 -0.0398 —0.0040 -0.0389 -0.1267
(1.03) (0.37) (1.04) (0.30) (0.87) (3.13)
Note: The GMM estimates are obtained using all lagged values of the en-
dogenous variables and the ﬁrm variables (in diﬀerences). The ﬁrm variables
are assumed strongly exogenous. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 5 - Eﬀects of Past Earnings Growth and Level Changes on
Earnings Dynamics
Type: GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Dependent: ∆Base ∆Bonus ∆Total ∆Base ∆Bonus ∆Total
1 2 3 4 5 6
∆Baset−1 -0.1903 -0.2898
(2.56) (7.89)
∆Baset−2 -0.0184 -0.0352
(0.36) (1.10)
∆Baset−3 -0.0020 -0.0265
(0.30) (1.35)
∆Baset−4 0.0013
(0.30)
∆Bonust−1 -0.6788 -0.9301
(5.33) (5.34)
∆Bonust−2 -0.4289 -0.6094
(7.13) (4.08)
∆Bonust−3 -0.0608 -0.3584
(1.18) (2.12)
∆Bonust−4 -0.0356
(1.11)
∆Totalt−1 -0.6846 -1.0942
(51.98) (45.48)
∆Totalt−2 -0.3939 -0.7664
(28.90) (25.91)
∆Totalt−3 -0.0192 -0.4471
(2.88) (16.90)
∆Totalt−4 -0.0032
(0.42)
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Table 5 (continued)
∆Levelt -1.4289 -0.9479 -2.4489 -1.7688 -5.0422 -5.9307
(1.86) (0.46) (1.27) (2.20) (1.23) (2.26)
∆Levelt−1 -0.5460 -0.7666 -1.5111 -1.0609 0.1917 -0.1108
(2.68) (1.48) (2.24) (3.23) (0.26) (1.30)
∆Levelt−2 -0.4222 -0.7682 -1.4379 -0.8649 0.3535 0.0006
(2.19) (1.55) (2.34) (2.68) (0.50) (0.10)
∆Levelt−3 -0.3167 -0.8126 -1.1366 -0.5655 0.1019 -0.2240
(1.96) (1.52) (2.71) (2.09) (0.15) (3.10)
∆Levelt−4 -0.1356 -0.5985 -0.7076
(0.82) (1.02) (1.36)
∆Proﬁts 1.2392 14.7270 15.4071 0.8993 9.7226 6.9528
(2.31) (6.07) (10.69) (1.59) (3.32) (3.76)
∆Sales 0.2252 0.7336 1.0278 0.1823 0.7304 0.7700
(1.84) (2.94) (2.60) (1.10) (1.83) (1.45)
∆Size -0.0080 -0.0088 -0.0305 -0.0052 -0.0217 -0.0363
(0.60) (0.17) (0.79) (0.37) (0.30) (0.79)
Note: In the present speciﬁcation, current level change (∆Levelt) is al-
lowed to be endogenous and is instrumented out using all lag values of past
level changes. The estimates for the eﬀects of past earnings are obtained
using all lagged values of the past earnings variables and the ﬁrm variables.
The ﬁrm variables are assumed strongly exogenous. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
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Table 6A - Eﬀects of Past Earnings Growth and Level Changes on
Earnings Dynamics Assuming Weak Exogeneity of Current Level
Change
Type: GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Dependent: ∆Base ∆Bonus ∆Total ∆Base ∆Bonus ∆Total
1 2 3 4 5 6
∆Baset−1 -0.1511 -0.2877
(6.86) (7.98)
∆Baset−2 0.0067 -0.0334
(0.40) (1.06)
∆Baset−3 -0.0003 -0.0263
(0.08) (1.34)
∆Baset−4 0.0014
(0.33)
∆Bonust−1 -0.6786 -0.9248
(51.90) (43.88)
∆Bonust−2 -0.4279 -0.5964
(29.01) (20.88)
∆Bonust−3 -0.0607 -0.3499
(5.44) (2.32)
∆Bonust−4 -0.0331
(2.48)
∆Totalt−1 -0.6839 -1.0844
(52.09) (45.97)
∆Totalt−2 -0.3924 -0.7491
(29.04) (26.11)
∆Totalt−3 -0.0192 -0.4477
(2.88) (16.84)
∆Totalt−4 -0.0012
(0.16)
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Table 6A (continued)
∆Levelt -1.1814 -0.3959 -0.4888 -1.5200 1.3231 1.0999
(5.69) (0.66) (0.78) (4.89) (1.34) (1.12)
∆Levelt−1 -0.4916 -0.6355 -1.2336 -1.0025 0.6880 0.4905
(2.33) (1.03) (1.92) (3.14) (0.67) (0.48)
∆Levelt−2 -0.3907 -0.6723 -1.2619 -0.8388 0.6391 0.3619
(1.98) (1.16) (2.09) (2.62) (0.63) (0.36)
∆Levelt−3 -0.2940 -0.7481 -1.0409 -0.5562 0.2111 -0.0771
(2.18) (1.94) (2.54) (2.06) (0.25) (0.09)
∆Levelt−4 -0.1298 -0.5483 -0.6207
(0.79) (1.10) (1.21)
∆Proﬁts 1.0988 14.7346 15.4000 0.8786 9.4093 6.6675
(2.42) (10.64) (10.69) (1.56) (5.15) (3.65)
∆Sales 0.1350 0.7213 1.0019 0.1792 0.6311 0.6620
(1.10) (1.90) (2.54) (1.09) (1.19) (1.26)
∆Size -0.0088 -0.0137 -0.0366 -0.0059 -0.0411 -0.0566
(0.79) (0.37) (0.96) (0.42) (0.92) (1.26)
Note: The GMM estimates are obtained using all lagged values of the past
earnings variables and the ﬁrm variables. The ﬁrm variables are assumed
strongly exogenous. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 6B - Summary of the Eﬀects of Current Promotions on
Earnings Growth
base bonus total
# of lags ∆Level
3 endo. -1.4289 -0.9479 -2.4489
4 endo. -1.7688 -5.0422 -5.9307
3 exog. -1.1814 -0.3959 -0.4888
4 exog -1.5200 1.3231 1.0999
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8 Data Appendix
Table A1
Individual and Firm Characteristics
(1 Observation per Individual/Firm, 1980 $USD)
Individual Firm
Variable Mean S.D. Variable Mean S.D.
Education 16.3 1.9 Proﬁts (Bil.) 0.128 0.338
Tenure 13.3 10.3 Sales (Bil.) 2.698 6.127
Age 46.1 8.7 Size (000s) 27.972 40.301
Level 4.2 1.4
Base 60295.55 40795.8
Bonus 13484.72 26258.0
Total 73780.27 62790.4
N 33482 N 385
Note: Size refers to total ﬁrm employment.
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Table A2
Percent of Individuals with Positive and Negative Changes
in Real and Nominal Base Pay, Bonus and Total Compensation
(Data pooled across all individuals)
Year: 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Nominal ∆
∆Base>0 88.7% 76.8% 85.2% 81.9% 84.0% 82.9% 84.8%
∆Base=0 10.5 21.5 14.3 17.5 14.8 16.5 14.6
∆Base<0 0.8 1.7 0.1 0.6 1.2 0.6 0.6
∆Bonus>0 54.1% 36.8% 56.0% 54.9% 44.9% 54.9% 56.5%
∆Bonus=0 25.0 24.8 26.1 28.5 24.1 20.1 21.5
∆Bonus<0 20.9 38.4 17.9 16.7 31.0 25.0 22.0
∆Total>0 87.9% 70.6% 85.4% 83.5% 77.5% 80.8% 81.3%
∆Total=0 3.4 6.3 6.0 9.4 5.4 4.1 6.2
∆Total<0 8.7 23.1 8.5 7.1 17.1 15.1 12.6
Real ∆
∆Base>0 77.3% 75.0% 81.4% 80.0% 80.3% 82.4% 74.3%
∆Base<0 22.7 25.0 18.6 20.0 19.7 17.6 25.7
∆Bonus>0 48.8% 35.1% 54.2% 53.0% 42.3% 54.3% 53.5%
∆Bonus=0 19.8 19.0 20.9 19.5 18.3 16.9 16.4
∆Bonus<0 31.3 45.8 24.9 27.5 39.4 28.8 30.0
∆Total>0 69.8% 61.1% 77.3% 76.8% 67.1% 77.6% 69.4%
∆Total<0 30.2 38.9 22.7 23.2 32.9 22.4 30.6
Notes: ∆denotes the change in the given variable. Rates of inﬂation were as
follows: 1981 10.4%, 1982 6.1%, 1983 3.2%, 1984 4.3%, 1985 3.6%, 1986 1.9%,
1987 3.7%, 1988 4.1%.
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Table A3
Change in Annual Proﬁt, Sales, Size, Level, Base Pay and Bonus
(1980 $USD, ∆Proﬁts and ∆Sales in millions, data pooled across all
individuals)
∆Prof ∆Sale ∆Size ∆Lev ∆Base ∆Bon
Yr Mean S .D . M ean S.D . M ean S .D . M ean S.D . M ean S.D . M ean S.D .
82 4.4 134 43.5 440 -109 7185 -0.03 0.7 2059.5 7109 2074.4 15971
83 -26.8 132 -32.2 1271 -354 11853 0.02 0.6 2750.5 6969 -1841.0 17510
84 -12.2 92 -110.8 761 -236 4622 -0.04 0.6 3105.3 7193 2919.8 14585
85 23.0 134 104.2 531 -116 6751 -0.01 0.6 2994.3 7047 3879.5 18266
86 -37.4 164 -36.3 556 171 7146 -0.06 0.6 2831.2 7716 327.9 17707
87 8.1 170 -11.5 992 -902 12661 -0.06 0.6 4003.9 7445 3847.9 32768
88 13.7 162 60.7 400 211 4560 -0.03 0.5 2663.9 7593 3144.6 38164
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Table A4
Transitions in Reporting Level
(Data pooled across all years and individuals, 1980 USD)
Mean Mean Mean
Level changes % ∆Base ∆Bonus ∆Total
∆L(≤ −4) 0.01
∆L(−3) 0.10 5760 1808 7569
∆L(−2) 1.45 3763 1561 5324
∆L(−1) 11.76 4169 1125 5294
∆L(0) 74.91 2709 2066 4775
∆L(+1) 10.30 2341 841 3182
∆L(+2) 1.25 1918 1927 3846
∆L(+3) 0.80 1850 2873 4723
∆L(≥ 4) 0.03
Note: ∆L(−s) denotes a promotion of s levels. ∆L(+s) denotes a demo-
tion of s levels.
35
Table A5
Simple Correlation Coeﬃcients
(Data pooled across all years and individuals, 1980 USD)
Lag Lag Lag
∆Base ∆Bonus ∆Total
∆Base 0.0031
∆Bonus -0.0374
∆Total -0.0104
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